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CHOOSING THE JUDGES WHO CHOOSE THE
PRESIDENT
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE*

George W. Bush might not be the forty-third President of the United States
but for the United States Supreme Court. Al Gore's own candidacy for the
Presidency would have ended two weeks earlier had it not been for two
decisions of the Florida Supreme Court. This unprecedented-albeit
unsolicited'-judicial involvement in the election of the President provoked
unimaginably hostile attacks upon both courts. Bush's supporters accused the
Florida court of distorting state election law and ignoring federal statutory and
constitutional requirements in an effort to facilitate the election of Gore. When
the tables turned a few days later, Gore's supporters voiced the same charges.
It was not a happy time to be a judge.
These events occurred in the midst of a longstanding debate concerning
the best method of choosing the individuals who will serve as judges. State
court judges have faced strongly contested elections. On the same day that
voters selected the President, elections for state court judgeships attracted an
unprecedented amount of money and attention in Ohio, Michigan, and
elsewhere. Likewise, federal judicial nominees have confronted increasingly
skeptical senators and hostile interest groups. The appointment of federal
judges was an issue in the presidential campaign itself.2 Even after the election
was resolved, President Clinton demonstrated his frustration with the federal
judicial selection process by naming Roger Gregory to a position on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the first recess appointment by
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' Professor, Notre Dame Law School, nagle.8@nd.edu. I am grateful for the opportunity
to
participate in the symposium on judicial elections held by the Capital University Law School
on January 30, 2001.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). The Court stated:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are
the Members of this Court, and none stand in more admiration of the
Constitution's design to leave the selection of the President to the people,
through their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending
parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought
responsibility to resolve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial
system has been forced to confront.
Id.
E.g. Editorial, Election 2000 Presidential Race: Courts on Political Stage, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 24,2000, at M4.
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a lame-duck president in recent memory.' The circumstances of President
Bush's election, combined with the closely divided Senate in the 107th
Congress, have greatly complicated the confirmation of Bush's judicial
nominees.
The stakes for the selection of judges have never been so high. Federal
and state court judges have ruled on such divisive issues as education funding,
exclusionary zoning, capital punishment, same-sex marriages, school prayer,
affirmative action, partial birth abortion, and legislative redistricting. And all
of that occurred before the courts were called upon to intervene in the selection
of the President of the United States.
The selection of those who possess such awesome powers is bound to be
contested. But the mode of choosing judges is a secondary question. The
debate concerning the selection of judges is fueled by a broader debate about
the appropriate role of judges. If one feels passionately about a particular
substantive issue or a conception of the judicial power, and if the individuals
who wish to serve as judges are seen to hold contrasting views on those issues,
then it is perfectly understandable why the selection of judges has become
such a flashpoint for the most intractable social issues that states and the entire
nation confront today.
The procedures for choosing those judges are caught up in this larger
substantive debate, and rightly so. Any effort to identify the "best" candidates
for judicial office presupposes a vision of an ideal judge or an ideal judiciary.
For some, that vision seeks a diversity of life experiences and individual
characteristics. For others, the vision focuses on how the legal expertise that a
prospective judge brings to the judicial office. But those profound questions
begin to fade when selecting a judge who must decide presidential election
contests or questions of life and death. Then judicial philosophy becomes
paramount.
Remarks on the Recess Appointment of Roger L. Gregory to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and an Exchange with Reporters, 36 PUB. PAPERS (Jan. 1,
2001). The fact that Congress was in recess when the President appointed Gregory was
unusual, but not unprecedented, as demonstrated by Presidents Truman's and Kennedy's recess
appointments to the federal courts. Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for
Purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause?,92 MICH. L. REV. 2204,2213 (1994). Nor was
the appointment the only recent one made by a lame-duck president: President Carter
nominated and appointed Stephen Breyer to the First Circuit after Carter was defeated in the
November 1980 election, but the Senate was still in session and it confirmed Breyer's
appointment. John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable,72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 470,
492-93 (1997). But Gregory was the first judicial appointment by a lame-duck president while
the Senate was in recess, at least since the Twentieth Amendment shortened the lame-duck
period in 1933. Upon taking office, President Bush re-nominated Gregory for a permanent
position on the Fourth Circuit. Nominations Submitted to the Senate, 37 PUB. PAPERS (May
14, 2001).
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The primary importance of judicial philosophy only begins the debate on
the best mode ofjudicial selection. Neitherjudicial elections, nor merit based
systems, nor executive appointments, nor a hybrid combination of those means
can claim to consistently produce judges who possess the preferred judicial
philosophy. Instead, the effectiveness of each method depends how they are
employed. A variety of innovative responses like those proposed by Paul
Carrington,' and the creative application of the diverse existing systems, holds
the most promise of ensuring the accountability of judges to both the rule of
law and to the People.

I.
There are two principal methods of selecting judges in the United States:
appointment and election.' The federal judiciary illustrates the best-known
process for the appointment of judges. Article II of the United States
Constitution provides that the President appoints Justices subject to the advice
and consent of the Senate.' The current members of the Court were appointed
by five different Presidents: three by President Reagan, two each by Presidents
Bush and Clinton, and one each by Presidents Ford and Nixon.' They all
received the consent of the Senate, albeit with varying degrees of support,
unlike one of President Reagan's nominees and two of President Nixon's.'
Federal court of appeals and district court judges are appointed through the
identical process, with somewhat more mixed results for presidential judicial
nominees facing Senate confirmation. Once in office, Article II of the United
States Constitution grants life tenure to federal judges, subject only to
impeachment by the Senate.'
The federal judicial appointment process is the most familiar way of
selecting judges, yet the election of judges is more common in the United
States. Nearly twice as many states rely upon elections to select judges than
rely upon executive or legislative appointment. 10Elective judiciaries emerged
4
Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in
Highest State Courts, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 113-25 (1998).
5
See MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION,
COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 4-10 (1987).
6
7

U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR

OPINIONS 1910-11 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1997).
a

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF

SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY (1986).
°
U.S. CONST. art Ill, § 1.
'0
Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of
Law. 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725-26 (1995) (reporting that twenty-three states use elections to
select judges, twelve use appointments, and the balance employ some combination of the two
procedures).
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in the early nineteenth century due to a confluence of motivations." Some
judicial elections today are partisan, while others are nonpartisan.' 2 Judicial
candidates are often subject to a special set of ethical canons modeled on those
promulgated by the American Bar Association." In other respects, judicial
elections are like other elections.
A hybrid model combines the initial appointment of judges with periodic
retention elections." Florida uses such an approach. The Governor of Florida
appoints the seven justices of the Florida Supreme Court." Of the current
justices, Governor Lawton Chiles appointed five, Governor (and now Senator)
Bob Graham appointed one, and Chiles and incumbent Governor Jeb Bush
appointed one jointly." Once in office, the justices must be approved in
retention elections every six years. 7 The current justices have all survived
their periodic retention elections, though not for want of opposition.", Justice
Harry Lee Anstead will likely face electoral opposition in 2002 for joining the
court's 4-3 majority opinion that, at least momentarily, revived Gore's
presidential hopes."
1U.
How judges should be chosen depends upon what kind of judges are
desired. The history of judicial selections suggests three general criteria for
identifying a desirable judge. One criterion emphasizes the representation of
diverse groups within the judiciary. Geographic diversity was crucial
I
Id. at 717 ("Marbury, Jacksonianism, participation in politics by settlers of the
western frontier, judicial rulings favorable to creditors, resistance to the English common law,
and judicial corruption are all overlapping factors frequently mentioned by scholars
(Jacksonianism most of all) as contributing to the adoption of elective judiciaries.").
1
Carrington, supra note 4, at 142.
E.g. MODELCODEOFJUDICIALCONDUCT (1990). See also James J. Alfini &Terrence
13

J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election Campaigns: A Review and Critique of
Canon 7, 77 Ky. L.J. 671 (1989); Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical Campaigns for the Judiciary, 29
TEx. TECH. L. REV. 811 (1998).
"
Carrington, supra note 4, at 143-44.
"
FLA. CONST. art. V, § II (a).
1
Shane R. Heskin, High Court Study, Florida's State Constitutional Adjudication: A
Significant Shi/i as Three New Members Take Seats on the State's Highest Court?, 62 ALB. L.
REV. 1547, 1559-60 (1999).
"
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
Is
See Carrington, supra note 4, at n.185 and accompanying text (noting past efforts to
challenge sitting Florida Supreme Court justices).
19

High Court Justice in Florida Will Be Target at Election, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,

Dec. 15, 2000, at A13. The three other justices in the majority easily survived their own
retention elections days before they confronted the issues raised by the presidential election.
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throughout the nineteenth century. "0 Certain positions on the Supreme Court
were viewed as the "New England seat" or the "Southern seat," to be occupied
only by jurists hailing from that part of the nation." Religious diversity has
also been important on occasion, particularly since the implicit establishment
of a "Jewish seat" on the Court with President Wilson's appointment of Justice
Brandeis.2 More recently, racial and gender diversity has played a significant
role in appointments throughout the federal and state judiciary."
In each instance, the premise of the selection is that there is a virtue in
selecting judges belonging to different groups within the state or the nation.24
The benefit can be to the court if one believes that the inclusion of such
diversity improves the work of the court itself. The benefit can also extend to
the groups themselves if their perspective is included within thejudiciary. The
Court has implicitly recognized the force of this model by holding that state
court judges are "representatives" within the meaning of the federal Voting
Rights Act.Y
A second approach seeks the selection of the "best" judges as determined
by some objective measure of judicial qualifications." These measures can
include wisdom, legal skills, and judicial temperament. Or they can emphasize
the impartiality of the judge as evidenced by the absence of any bias toward
campaign contributors and other parties, partisan considerations, or judicial
philosophy. The various merit selection schemes employed and proposed for
the selection of state court judges rest upon the belief that such characteristics
are both measurable and most appropriate for the selection of judges.
The third general approach to judicial selection considers the substantive
perspective of a judicial candidate. This perspective can be gleaned either from
indications of general judicial philosophy or from positions on particular
substantive issues. The repeated calls for judges that will interpret the law
instead of make the law suggest a quite different judicial philosophy from
admonitions to select judges who will employ all of their powers to do justice.
Likewise, several issues have dominated the selection of federal and state
20
See Ronald D. Rotunda, InnovationsDisguised as Traditions:A HistoricalReview of
the Supreme Court Nominations Process, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 123, 125-26 (1995).
21
See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 128 (noting the New York seat and the New England

seat); Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Judges: Some HistoricalPerspectives, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1146, 1150-51 (1988) (describing the New England seat).
22
TRIBE, supra note 8, at 128 (noting the Jewish seat and the Catholic seat).
21 Id. at 133.
24
See id. at 132-33.
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,404 (1991).
26

See JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS WHITE PAPER TASK FORCE, THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL

at

APPOINTMENTS,

soc.org/Publications/White%20Papers/judicialappointments.htm
[hereinafter WHITE

PAPER TASK FORCE].

(last

http://www.fedmodified 2001)
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judges. The right to an abortion has been especially prominent in the
appointment of many recent Supreme Court Justices, lower federal court
judges, and state court judges. 21 Capital punishment provides another example,
as illustrated by the failure of Rose Bird and two of her colleagues to win the
retention election necessary for her to continue to serve on the California
Supreme Court; the defeat of Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White
and Mississippi Supreme Court Justice James Robertson in retention elections;
and most recently by the Senate's refusal to confirm Missouri Supreme Court
Justice Ronnie White to a federal district court judgeship." Issues of racial
justice can play such a substantial role in judicial selections that Pamela Karlan
has described Brown v. Board of Education'9 as "the third rail of judicial
nomination: touch it and you die.""
Such reliance upon a judge's perspective on particular issues has been
controversial. The concern is that judicial nominees and candidates are
somehow compromised if they are required to state their position on a
particular issue that might come before them once they are judges, but without
having the benefits that the adversary process affords for deciding a question.
In other words, litmus tests for judicial candidates are frowned upon. Thus,
Vice President Gore tried to avoid stating that he would only appoint judges
who agreed with the constitutional right to an abortion even as he hinted that
such a result was an expected outcome of his general judicial philosophy.'1
Likewise, state judicial candidates around the country commonly face
questions whenever they appear to suggest a position on a particular legal issue
during the course of an election campaign. Indeed, the canons governing
judicial elections prohibit candidates from campaigning based upon their
position on particular issues that they could then be in a position to decide as a
judge. 1 Nonetheless, statements of judicial philosophy can serve as a proxy
See Carrington, supra note 4, at 80 (mentioning "[the sustained assault on the
presidency of Bill Clinton that began the day of his election in 1992 was, it seems, initially
animated in part by the purpose of preventing him from appointing Supreme Court Justices
27

who would reaffirm Roe v. Wade").

See id. at 83, 110 (discussing the electoral defeat of Bird, Robertson, and Penny
White). For a brief discussion of Ronnie White's confirmation experience, see infra potes 8388 and accompanying text.
"

30

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts ofJudicialIndependence, 72 S.CAL. L.REV. 535,

543 (1999).
31

The 2000 Campaign; Transcript of Debate Between Vice President Gore and

Governor Bush, N.Y. Timm. Oct. 4, 2000, at A30 (Vice President Gore explained that "[i]t'd
be very likely that [his Supreme Court appointments would] uphold Roe v. Wade, but I do
believe it's wrong to use a litmus test.").
2
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3) (1990) (stating "a candidate for a
judicial office ...
(d)shall not: (i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
(continued)
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for views on particular issues, and such statements are more often encouraged
than discouraged.
These three approaches tojudicial selection are not mutually exclusive. A
prospective judge might be desirable because she adds diversity to the court,
she is widely respected for her abilities, and she holds the preferred judicial
philosophy. President Bush, for example, has championed his first judicial
nominees as satisfying each of those criteria." Sometimes, though, a judicial
candidate fails to receive the approval of all of those interested in the
composition of the courts because the three criteria often lead in different
directions., Then we need to decide what kind ofjudges we want. Once that
is done, it must be determined which method of judicial selectionappointment, election, or hybrid-is most likely to produce them.

MI.
The debate concerning the role that the courts played in the 2000
presidential election illustrates the importance of who serves as judges on
those courts. The judicial decisions rendered in response to that election
elicited charges of judicial activism, partisanship, and incompetence. Both the
United States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court faced such
criticisms, albeit from different critics.
The most troubling criticisms suggested the judges acted to further their
own judicial agendas. The Florida Supreme Court's seeming emphasis on
generalized ideas of intent rather than textual plain meaning worked in favor of
Vice President Gore, who favored such an approach to statutory interpretation.
The United States Supreme Court's Equal Protection holding led to
complaints that is was designed solely to favor Governor Bush, whom many
expect to appoint judges more sympathetic to the judicial philosophy of the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; (ii) make statements that commit
or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely
to come before the court").
"
See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President During
Federal Judicial Appointments Announcement (May 9, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010509-3.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2002) (explaining his judicial nominees "come from diverse backgrounds, and will bring a
wide range of experience to the bench;" they "have sterling credentials and have met high
standards of legal training, temperament and judgment," and each nominee "clearly
understands the role of ajudge is to interpret the law, not to legislate from the bench"); see also
Elizabeth A. Palmer, Early Signs ofComity Emerge in JudicialNomination Process,CONG. Q.
WKLY, May 12,2001, at 1071 (describing Bush's first judicial nominees as "generally young,
conservative and ethnically and racially diverse").
3
See Thomas L. Jipping, Senate Stonewalling: Lawmakers Delaying Judicial
Confirmations WASH. TIMEs, Jan. 14,2002, at Al7 (discussing the effect of partisanship on the
confirmation process).

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[30:499

majority. True or not, such charges have become commonplace in the
immediate aftermath of the 2000 presidential election.
Neal Kumar Katyal wrote the most striking response to the Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore: "Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has been
received well by the public and Congress. Now all that is jeopardized."" With
all respect to Professor Katyal, whose excellent scholarship I very much
admire, this statement profoundly misconceives the popular attitude toward the
Court during that past sixty years. The Court has been the object of bitter
hostility for its decisions concerning abortion, the Establishment Clause,
school segregation, and affirmative action, to name just a few issues. The very
adjectives that Professor Kutyal applied to Bush v. Gore-"lawless and
unprecedented"--have also been deployed to describe many other
controversial decisions." Those terms, moreover, were used to characterize the
Florida Supreme Court's decision that was reversed in Bush v. Gore." Nor are
such views limited to isolated decisions. In 1996, for example, the scholarly
journal FirstThings published a symposium on the illegitimacy of the Court,
suggesting that civil disobedience to the Court's rulings was in order.1 Similar
complaints often arise concerning the Court's jurisprudence in the areas of
race, religion, and sexuality.
The point is that the People often disagree with the Court's determination
of "what the law is."" Nor is this phenomenon limited to constitutional law.
The Florida courts demonstrated that statutory interpretation can be just as
important and troubling as constitutional interpretation. Common law
decisions regarding tort liability, property rights, or contractual duties can
become unpopular. Even the content of international law can generate
substantial public debate.
35

Neal Kumar Katyal, Politics Over Principle,WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35.
E.g. Alan M. Dershowitz, On Demjanjuk, UnprecedentedLawlessness,WALLST.J.,

Aug. 5, 1993, at A12 (criticizing the Sixth Circuit's decision to re-open a prior habeas corpus
petition filed by a former Nazi officer six years after the court had first ruled).
E.g. Richard L. Berke, Contesting the Vote: The Strategies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2000, at Al (quoting Jack Kemp as stating "[tioday, America has witnessed a judicial coup
d'etat by the Florida Supreme Court unprecedented in modern history."); Linda Greenhouse,
17

Counting the Vote: The Legal Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at AI (quoting Bush's brief

in the United States Supreme Court, which described the Florida Supreme Court as having
"embarked on ad hoc, standardless and lawless exercise of judicial power, which appears
designed to thwart the will of the electorate"). Still more tellingly, my LEXIS search among
news sources published during the three months after the election for "Florida Supreme
Court" and (lawless or unprecedented)was interrupted because it would have returned more

than one thousand results.
Is

Symposium, The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of Politics, FIRST
THINGS, Nov. 1996, at 18.
39
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Any disagreement between the courts and the People about the meaning of
the law suggests that one of them must be wrong. The alternative methods of
judicial selection, in turn, presuppose different answers to the question of
whether the courts or the People are more likely to be wrong. Conventional
legal wisdom discounts the possibility that the courts may be wrong about the
law instead of the People. Opposition to judicial elections, for example, claims
that the People are easily misled by judicial campaigns and that they lack the
ability to discern the qualities that produce a good judge. Conversely, merit
selection systems assert that the best judges will be those individuals with the
most legal skills. More broadly, the law is increasingly viewed as something
that can be understood only by those with special expertise-in other words,
lawyers. The more expert the lawyer, the better the candidate to serve as a
judge.
This is amply demonstrated by the media's reliance upon so many law
professors to explain the daily developments in the battle between Governor
Bush and Vice President Gore after Election Day 2000. The many legal issues
raised during the election decision involved previously obscure federal
constitutional provisions and virtually unknown state election statutes. The
legal questions surrounding the recount and contest procedures were so
obscure that all questions of the mechanics of an election are omitted
altogether from the only casebook on election law." Thus many of the
confident claims about the legal questions were based on knowledge that the
academic experts themselves had only gained since election day. I speak from
experience, having appeared regularly on the local television news broadcast to
explain legal issues that I had examined myself for the first time only hours
before.
The contention that such legal expertise ineluctably yields the best
judiciary is in tension with three related strands of legal thought. First, it
collides with the emphasis that the literature on judicial selections places upon
the need for the accountability of judges to the People. Judges must be both
independent and accountable. Independence protects judges from popular
passions that demand actions contrary to the rule of law. Accountability is a
necessary check on judges whose vision of the law begins to be shaded more
by their own desires than the designs of the People who made it.
Accountability is ensured by judicial elections, legislative advice and consent
to judicial appointments, the regulation of a court's jurisdiction, limitations on
0

DANIEL HAYS LOWENSThIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1995); see also

SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL

PROCESS (1998) (another otherwise excellent book that omits any discussion of the mechanics
of elections). The 2000 election began to remedy that void in the academic literature within a
matter of weeks.

SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF

DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000 (2001) (casebook supplement on
election law procedures).

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[30:499

court funding, and the awareness that statutes and constitutions can be changed
in response to an unwanted court ruling. Accountability can also be achieved
through informal mechanisms, such as the need for judicial decisions to
"generate sufficient support to ensure their execution.""
Judges ignore such accountability at their own peril. Professor Carrington
has carefully documented the many instances in which the courts failed to
remember their relationship to the People.'2 The 1986 electoral defeat of Chief
Justice Bird occurred after "the California Supreme Court had supplied its
critics with an ample list of decisions reflecting the court's disregard for moral
and political values widely shared by Californians."'" The court did more than
act contrary to the wishes of most state citizens, "[it had forsaken even the
pretense of an institution engaged in the interpretation of authoritative legal
texts or traditions enacted by the people or their representatives whose votes
they would need to retain their offices."" This episode was just the most
recent of the People rising "to throw off the yoke of judicial oppression.""
Professor Akhil Amar reinforced the concern for accountability in his
recent article, The Document and the Doctrine." Professor Amar's thesis is

that the courts have wrongly exalted judicial doctrine over actual legal
documents, to the detriment of the law more generally. 7 For Professor Amar,
the United States Constitution itself contains better law than the Supreme
Court's constitutional law jurisprudence." The Court's 1999 term alone
provides Professor Amar with seven examples of the dichotomy between the
constitutional text and constitutional decisions. In Flippo v. Virginia," the
Court reversed the conviction of a man who murdered his wife because the
jury considered evidence obtained by the police when they opened a briefcase
in the course of securing the crime scene." Professor Amar contrasts the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures with
the Court's exclusionary rule, objecting to Flippo because the police search
was not unreasonable and because of the absence of textual support for the
exclusionary rule.3' In Carmellv. Texas." the Court reversed the conviction of
Croley, supra note 10, at 709.
Carrington, supra note 4, at 89-107.
4
Id. at 83-84.
id. at 86.
"
Id. at 87.
Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REV.
"
26 (2000).
"
Id. at 133.
"
See id. at 26 (asserting that "the Constitution has often proved more enlightened and
enlightening than the case law glossing it.").
4
528 U.S. It (1999).
so
Id. at 12-15.
41

42

S1

Amar. supra note 46, at 90-95.
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a man who sexually assaulted his stepdaughter because the state had relied
upon a different evidentiary law than had existed at the time of the attacks."
Professor Amar contrasts the actual Ex Post Facto Clause with the broad and
rigid doctrine applied by the Court in excluding the evidence.- In United
States v. Morrison," the Court held that the civil cause of action created in the
Violence Against Women Act exceeded congressional power under the
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.5' Professor Amar contrasts
"the vision of the Fourteenth Amendment" with the troublesome nineteenth
century precedents upon which the Court relied." In Stenberg v. Carhart,"the
Court invalidated a Nebraska statute prohibiting partial birth abortions.59
Professor Amar contrasts the potentially relevant constitutional textsincluding the Preamble, which states the desire to "secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity"--with the Court's abortion
jurisprudence, concluding that "Casey built on Roe without ever explaining
why Roe was right. Now Stenberg builds on Casey and Roe, and critics may
justly feel that this is a shell game with no pea."" In Kimel v. FloridaBoardof
Regents," the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
could not empower state employees to sue states for damages. 5 Professor
Amar contrasts the Eleventh Amendment with the Court's state sovereignty
immunity decisions, repeating his claim that the original decision of Hans v.
Louisiana"was misguided. '° In Mitchell v. Helms," the Court upheld a federal
program that provided computers and other educational equipment to private
religious schools along with other private and public schools.' Professor
Amar contrasts the Establishment Clause with the Court's contrary decisions
of recent years, applauding the Court for heeding the document instead of its
doctrine in this instance." Finally, in Troxel v. Granville," the Court
52
3
34

529 U.S. 513 (2000).
Id. at 516-17, 552-53.
Amar, supra note 46, at 96-102.

3

529 U.S. 598 (2000).

S6

Id. at 627.

55

Amar, supra note 46, at 103-09.
530 U.S. 914 (2000).

59

Id. at 922.

W

Amar, supra note 46,at 113 (quoting the U.S. CONST. Pmbl.) (emphasis added).
Id. at 110.
528 U.S. 62 (2000).

5

61
62

"

Id. at 66-67.
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Amar, supra note 46, at 114-18.
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
Id. at 801.
I6

69

Amar, supra note 46, at 118-21.

63
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invalidated a Washington statute that granted broad visitation rights to
grandparents."° Professor Amar contrasts the Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause with the Court's confusing substantive due
process precedents, concluding that the Court got the case right but for the
wrong reasons." One can disagree with the particular examples offered by
Professor Amar, but his general point regarding the divorce between
constitutional text and constitutional doctrine is more difficult to refute.
The third tension is best explained in the work of Mike Paulsen. Drawing
upon an analogy to the original television program Star Trek that I could not
do justice to here, Paulsen chides the Court for distancing the law from the
People:
The Court speaks in terms of multi-part tests and tiers of
scrutiny, language that corrupts the plain-spoken words of a
document intended to be accessible to all, and to belong to
all, by adding a venire of pseudo-sophisticated legalese. This
corruption serves to distance the people from their
Constitution by rendering it inaccessible to common
understanding. Simultaneously, it removes the Constitution
from the People's view and from their control. Thus
corrupted, the words of the Constitution, our fundamental
charter of rights and of government, have become the
exclusive province of an elite cabal of high priests. The
priests are careful to recite the formulae of their predecessors,
rather than the words of the document itself, and so keep up
the illusion that their guardianship is necessary in order to
translate an increasingly incomprehensible document (which
they have made so) into concrete command they then issue to
the (small "p") people as "law." The people are treated,
rightly as it turns out, as constitutional illiterates who lack the
understanding necessary to read the Constitution with their
own eyes. That2 task must be performed by a special class of
intermediaries.
Paulsen's article offers several proposals for "returning the Constitution to
the interpretive supremacy of the People,"' though none involve changes in
the selection or tenure of judges. Those recommendations appear elsewhere in
530 U.S. 57 (2000).
Id. at 75.
Amar, supra note 46, at 122-24.
n
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T.Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional
Interpretism: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALa. L. REv. 671,
674-75 (1995).
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Paulsen's work, where he explicitly endorses the primacy of judicial
philosophy in the presidential and senate evaluation of prospective judges.,,
But the ability of the People to understand their laws better than the
judiciary should not be exaggerated. The People are probably more prone than
judges to confuse popular policy preferences with the outcomes demanded by
the rule of law. A system that would rely upon the People alone to apply their
laws could encounter great difficulty in preserving the rule of law as we debate
what law or even "the law" is. These problems are substantial, and they help
establish the need for an independent judiciary taught to both abide by and to
expound the law. But we also need a means for addressing those cases in
which the People, not the court, are right about the law.

IV.
If we expect the courts to do things like resolve disputes about presidential
elections, then judicial philosophy is paramount in selecting judges. Indeed,
judges decide many other questions that transcend the temporary holder of the
Presidency, including the scope of individual rights of expression and privacy
in a free society, the role of race and religion in a culture divided by both, and
issues of life and death such as abortion and capital punishment. But judges
also decide far more mundane questions, and far more of them. The reported
decisions are filled with disputes concerning the application of tax codes, the
disposition of personal bankruptcies, the minutiae of hazardous waste
regulation, and countless other cases that are of keen concern to the parties
litigating the issue but few others. The vast number of unreported local, state,
and even federal judicial decisions are by definition less worthy of popular
concern.
Perhaps, then, different judges should be chosen in different ways. Judges
who decide cases that lack interest to the People could be chosen by simple
executive appointment or merit selection; judges who rule on the most
controversial questions affecting social policy could be elected or appointed by
the executive with legislative confirmation designed to probe judicial
philosophy. The problem with this approach is that legal issues are not neatly
sorted into those of interest to the People and those that are uninteresting. A
state trial court judge might seem the ideal candidate for a mode of selection
that emphasizes expertise instead of judicial philosophy, yet many such judges
played a crucial role during the Florida election disputes. Even those courts
with specialized jurisdiction sometimes encounter a case that raises a
controversial issue that holds great interest for the public at large. Nor, on the
other hand, is the fact that the Supreme Court has chosen to decide a case a
guarantee that the matter is of keen interest to the People. As Frederick
74
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J.
549, 562-78 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP
THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTs PROCESS (1994)).
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Schauer points out, the Justices themselves find many cases boring.,,

The prominence of the legal issues decided by different kinds of courts
should not be exaggerated, of course, because the United States Supreme
Court will confront many more controversial questions than the Circuit Court
of Leon County. Yet questions of judicial philosophy become relevant for a
wider range of judges as the People continue to present an increasing number
of important issues to all kinds of courts. So while judicial philosophy is of
greatest concern for the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, it is also
of great concern for state supreme court justices and federal circuit and district
judges, and is still of relevance for state and local judges at all levels. The
importance, and frequent primacy, of that criterion presents the most profound
question for evaluating methods of judicial selection: How do we choose
judges with the right judicial philosophy?
Judicial elections seem best designed to facilitate accountability. Elections
offer the People themselves a direct opportunity to measure their
understanding of the law against the jurisprudence of current or prospective
judges. But the reality of judicial elections raises serious questions regarding
the achievement of that goal. As Professor Carrington observes, experience
with judicial elections has demonstrated problems with the substantive content
of campaigns given the tension between articulating specific positions and
retaining impartiality once on the bench and the troublesome question of the
source of funding for the campaigns of judicial candidates.7 6 Elections often
fail to generate much public attention, though the increased spending on
judicial campaigns can begin to change that." Also, voters often complain that
it is difficult to understand the real issues raised in judicial elections, a problem
that is exacerbated by the restrictions on campaigning. The wisdom ofjudicial
elections raises other questions as well, even as such elections often fail to
achieve their intended purpose of achieving judicial accountability to the
People.
Merit selection systems are even worse from the perspective of
73

Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain

Meaning. 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 246 (referring to statutory interpretation cases).
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Carrington, supra note 4, at 91-93; see also WHITE PAPER TASK FORCE, supra note
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accountability-they are elitist. They are most disconnected from the views of
the People. They become even more problematic as we ask the courts to
decide broader social questions that are better understood by the public rather
than applying longstanding but obscure legal principles.
The federal judicial appointments process has problems of its own. First,
the role of the judiciary and the composition of its members is just one issue
among many to consider when voting for President. In the 2000 presidential
elections, Vice President Gore placed more emphasis on the President's role in
selecting judges than Governor Bush did, but the candidates also stressed a
variety of other substantive issues, including the economy, Social Security,
education, health care, the military, and foreign policy. Those many
substantive issues, moreover, competed with questions about the leadership
abilities, trustworthiness, intelligence, and other characteristics of the
candidates. Not surprisingly, exit polls indicated that the choice of judges
ranked low among the reasons that voters offered for their choice for
7
President. '
Second, voters cannot know how many Justices or judges their choice for
President will be able to select. Federal judges can control who will replace
them because they serve until they either retire or die." Increasingly, Supreme
Court Justices will not retire during the tenure of a President of the other
political party.' 0 They are more likely to retire than to die in office, thus
allowing a sitting member of the Court to influence the choice of his or.her
successor. The result is the closest thing to a hereditary succession based on
political party affiliation that exists under the United States Constitution.
Third, the President may find it necessary to balance competing criteria.
Ethnic and gender diversity continues to play a role in judicial appointments
throughout the nation. Even so, judicial philosophy often trumps diversity, as
demonstrated by the opposition of many civil rights groups to the nomination

This is not to say that the courts have never been a principal issue in a presidential
campaign. For example, "[f]ederal judicial power was one of the major issues in the
78

presidential elections of 1924." Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years After the Judges' Bill, 100 CoLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1681 (2000). Progressive
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of Clarence Thomas," and the efforts of some women's groups to block the
rumored choice of Fifth Circuit Judge Edith Jones for the position now
occupied by Justice Souter.
Fourth, there are many examples of judges whose performance on the
court came as an unpleasant surprise to those who appointed them. Most
famously, President Eisenhower regretted his appointments of Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Brennan." It is also doubtful that President Nixon was
pleased with his appointment of Justice Blackmun, or that President Bush
continues to approve of his appointment of Justice Souter. The same
phenomenon occurs frequently with lower federal court judges and with state
court judges precisely because judicial philosophy sometimes gives way to
other considerations, and especially because judicial philosophy is difficult to
discern.
V.
The irony is that an increased emphasis on judicial philosophy may make
it more difficult to determine a potential judge's judicial philosophy. The
awareness that one's expressed views on a topic of judicial attention can
threaten to discourage prospective judges from addressing any controversial
topics for fear of later opposition. President Bush's selection of David Souter
to the Supreme Court is often described as a stealth appointment because
Justice Souter had expressed so few views about the issues of greatest concern
to those who were most concerned about the Court. Nonetheless, evidence is
available to evaluate the judicial philosophy of many prospective judges.
Sometimes that evidence is gleaned from decisions that the individual made in
prior legislative, executive, or judicial offices. Sometimes the evidence is
found in the voluntary writings of an individual working in a governmental
position or in an academic capacity. Two examples involving the judicial
resolution of life-and-death questions well illustrate the way in which such
evidence of judicial philosophy is produced, and the consequences it can have.
Ronnie White failed to obtain Senate confirmation to a federal judgeship
because of what he wrote in the course of dissenting in several capital
punishment cases while serving on the Missouri Supreme Court." Those
opinions elicited strikingly different interpretations in the Senate. Perhaps
See Endorsements ofand Oppositionto Thomas, CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 15,1991, at C4
(listing several civil rights who were opposed to Justice Thomas' confirmation, including the
NAACP).
82
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APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 263 (2d ed. 1985) (recounting that "[w]hen Eisenhower
was asked later if he had made any mistakes while he had been President, he replied: 'Yes, two,
and they are both sitting on the Supreme Court.' 'Both' referred to Warren and Brennan."').
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See e.g. State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 123, 136 (Mo. 1998) (White, J., dissenting);
State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 340 (Mo. 1996) (White, J., dissenting).
"

2002] CHOOSING THE JUDGES WHO CHOOSE THE PRESIDENT 515
most importantly, they provoked a number of Missouri law enforcement
organizations to oppose his nomination." They found a champion in Senator
Ashcroft, who characterized White as someone who was inadequately sensitive
to the punishment of criminals." Ashcroft also emphasized the importance of
White's judicial philosophy for the position he was nominated to hold." As
Ashcroft explained, "if confirmed, Judge White will have the power to review
the death penalty decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court on habeas corpus.
In the seat of district court, Judge White's sole dissents are transformed into a
veto power over the judicial system of the State of Missouri."'" Judge White's
defenders protested that he did support capital punishment in appropriate
circumstances, that he was only following the governing law, and that his
record had been distorted by his opponents. They did not dispute the relevance
of Judge White's judicial philosophy to the position for which he was
nominated. Once defeated, Judge White's opponents were accused of acting
for a different motivation-racism-which they vehemently denied."
We may encounter an even more telling indication of the cost of
expressing one's judicial philosophy in the next few years. On July 1, 1991,
numerous sources reported that Emilio Miller Garza was likely to be President
Bush's choice to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court caused by the
retirement of Thurgood Marshall."9 The sources were wrong. The next day,
President Bush nominated Clarence Thomas. The ensuing confirmation
process was, let us say, unprecedented, but Justice Thomas took his seat on the
Supreme Court in October 1991. Garza has served on the Fifth Circuit since
then, and with the inauguration of a new President Bush, Garza is perfectly
positioned to become the first Hispanic justice on the Supreme Court. Except
that since 1991, he happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, and
according to the conventional wisdom about these matters, he said the wrong
thing.
Of course, it was not Garza's fault that he was chosen to sit on panels
deciding two abortion cases. But rather than exploit his status as a junior
judge by saying nothing when he agreed that Supreme Court precedent
dictated the result for the court of appeals, Judge Garza wrote two concurring

as
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opinions expressing his own opinions about the matter."
The first case should have been easy. In June 1991, Louisiana enacted a
law criminalizing abortion in nearly all circumstances."1 In defense of the
statute, the State argued "Roe v. Wade has been overruled sub silentio by
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, and its progeny."', That argument
vanished almost exactly one year later when the Supreme Court decided
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey.' Thus, when the Fifth Circuit reviewed the
Louisiana statute three months later, Judge Garza agreed that Casey
"reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe v. Wade," and the Louisiana statute
must fall as a result."
Garza did not even need to say that much; Judge Jolly reached that
conclusion in an opinion for the court that Judge Garza joined. 5 But Garza
added a short, three-paragraph concurrence, admitting "Casey, nonetheless,
causes me concern.""' He then proceeded to quote approvingly the Casey
dissents written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justice Scalia, relying upon
Justice Scalia to show Casey is about power, not abortion; and relying upon
Rehnquist to insist that "'liberty' gives way to protection of human life" in this
kind of situation." In a footnote, Garza directly challenged the Casey plurality
opinion's disclaimer that it was not mandating a moral code." Judge Garza
responded that "[s]tates legislate morality every day in the form of criminal
statutes"-and he cited Bowers v. Hardwick" to support the constitutionality of
such laws."' It only took two pages, but for a federal judge who could
entertain realistic hopes of serving on the Supreme Court, the rejection of a
constitutional right to abortion and the apparent approval of the state's power
to regulate homosexual activity-in a- concurrence, no less-was an
unconventional strategy.
That, however, was only the beginning. In 1997, Judge Garza once again
sat on a Fifth Circuit panel reviewing a Louisiana abortion statute.'0' The new
law, enacted in 1995, established a revised judicial bypass procedure available
90
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to a minor who wished to obtain an abortion but who did not want to secure
her parent's permission to do so.'0 ' The Supreme Court has upheld such
parental consent statutes, but only if they contain a very specific type of
parental bypass procedure. m Louisiana's original statute had tracked the
Court's requirements, but the 1995 amendments made two controversial
changes: (1) they provided that a judge "may" order an abortion if it is in the
minor's best interests or if the minor is sufficiently mature, rather than
providing that a judge "shall" order an abortion in such circumstances; and (2)
they directed the judge to notify the minor's parents when that notification is in

the minor's best interests.' 0'
Once again, the Fifth Circuit struck down the law.'tm Once again, Judge
Garza concurred in the court's opinion because he acknowledged that the
Supreme Court abortion precedents supported that result.'0' And once again,
Judge Garza wrote a special concurring opinion expressing his own thoughts
on the case. m This time, though, Judge Garza stated his opposition to Casey
and Roe much more directly, and he explained his reasoning in far greater
length. ' Indeed, by the time he was done, Judge Garza had compared the
Court's abortion jurisprudence to Dred Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, and

Lochner, and he had indicated his disagreement with Griswold and the entire
notion of substantive due process.'1'
I have not read the entire corpus of Judge Garza's work while serving on
the Fifth Circuit, but I do not need to. Right or wrong, Judge Garza's
concurrences greatly complicate the possibility that he will ever become
Justice Garza. Abortion is probably the most controversial issue facing the
Court, so the record of prospective judicial nominees is scrutinized to discern
the tiniest clues about how they might address such questions. ' to Judge Garza
has saved interested parties the trouble. By expressing his views so forcefully,
he has deprived himself of any opportunity for those who want to believe him
to be sure that he thinks exactly like them, a strategy responsible in part for the
current positions of Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas--and others before
them.
Id. at 1099.
E.g. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
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The details of Judge Garza's concurrences also prove the priority of
judicial philosophy. The fact that Judge Garza would become the first
Hispanic to serve on the Supreme Court, and that his other work has been
well-received by judicial observers, would probably be overwhelmed by
questions regarding his substantive approach to interpreting the Constitution,
reading federal statutes, and the role of the judiciary. And that is how it should
be.
VI.
What the stories of Judge Garza and Judge White do not resolve is the best
means of choosing judges, even if it is agreed that judicial philosophy is of
highest importance for the positions to which they aspire. We know the fate of
Judge White's nomination in the Senate; we can only speculate about a
possible nomination for Judge Garza. Would either of those judges be able to
be elected to a higher post? Judge White received the support of nearly twothirds of Missouri voters in his 1996 retention election,"' though whether he
would garner as much support nationwide under a hypothetical federal election
scheme is less certain. It is even more difficult to imagine whether Judge
Garza would prevail in a national election for the Supreme Court. It should be
noted, though, that the idea of a political campaign for a candidate to the
Supreme Court has already been proposed. Professor Paulsen has advised a
candidate "having a controversial paper trail of either ideological or
provocative, idiosyncratic views and who consequently faces a difficult
confirmation process in a potentially hostile or divided Senate" to wage a
proactive campaign for senate confirmation.'
The distance from such a
scenario to an elected judiciary is not too far.
There are other strategies as well. Judicial selections would be less
controversial if the stakes declined, but any effort to reduce the power of the
judiciary confronts the reality that many prefer an aggressive judiciary. Even
those who protest against judicial activism are sometimes accused of it, as
Bush v. Gore shows. The elimination of life tenure-a proposal advocated by
Professor Carrington" 3-would simultaneously reduce the stakes for any given
judicial selection, plus afford an opportunity to revisit a selection several years
after it is made."'
More realistically, and probably more wise in any event, the existing
checks on the selection of judges can be exploited more frequently. People
can vote against judges when retention elections are available. The Senate can
refuse to confirm judicial nominees who articulate an undesirable judicial
philosophy. During times of divided government, the Senate could also press
11
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the President to agree to some of its choices for judgeships as the prices for
approving the President's nominees.
The contentiousness of federal judicial appointments during the past
decade has obscured some movement toward a more collaborative approach to
judicial selection. During the latter years of the Clinton Administration, the
Senate was often criticized for refusing to consider nominees whom the
majority regarded as too liberal. Now, the Senate is being pressed to block
President Bush's judicial nominees because they are too conservative. If
neither the President nor the Senate relents, then there will be no new judges.
That was too often the result toward the end of the Clinton Administration
when little effort was made by President Clinton to identify prospective judges
who would be welcomed by the Republican majority in the Senate in order to
gain approval of other nominees whom the Senate would not otherwise
confirm.
President Bush's first nominees suggest a willingness to nominate a group
of judges that includes individuals who are appealing to a variety of
constituencies. The re-nomination of Roger Gregory, and the nomination of
New York Federal District Court Judge Barrington Parker to the Second
Circuit, serves as an unprecedented move toward a collaborative approach to
judicial nominations."' Individual senators, moreover, have suggested that
they will approve the appointment of nominees whom they would otherwise
oppose if the President also nominates judges they favor but who would
otherwise by unlikely to be selected by the President.' Only one such effort
was made under President Clinton when the Administration agreed to
nominate a conservative state Supreme Court justice to the Ninth Circuit in
exchange for Senator Gorton's approval of one of Clinton's other nominees to
that court, but the deal collapsed when the judge sought by Senator Gorton had
to withdraw from consideration because of family concerns." The precise
nature of what constitutes an appropriate compromise is almost always
contested, but the mere existence of such discussions represents a unique effort
to name judges who are acceptable as a group, even if they would face
"'5
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first eleven judicial nominees).
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resistance individually.
Such deals hold the most promise of appointing the most talented judges to
serve in the federal judiciary. For recent experience shows that it is often the
most talented judicial nominees who are most likely to face the most
opposition from groups who fear the influence that such individuals will
possess once on the bench. Nominees to federal courts of appeals are likely to
face particular scrutiny if they are viewed as potential candidates for future
Supreme Court vacancies. Thus, the most attractive feature of President
Bush's first nominees is that they are no more identical in judicial philosophy
than in other characteristics.
By contrast, any attempt to limit judicial selections to the narrow range of
individuals who are judged to hold a "moderate" judicial philosophy is a recipe
for failure. The threshold problem, of course, is that moderation is in the eye
the beholder. When Cass Sunstein believes that "[t]he Supreme Court has
moderates but no liberals,"'' while Robert Bork insists that "there is no farright legal thought in the U.S.,'"" the search for the elusive middle is unlikely
to include any potential judge who already holds a prominent place in
American law today. Yet the Senate's initial response to President Bush's first
nominees includes a continued desire to limit judicial nominees to undefined
moderates.
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle advised, "we don't want rightwingers. We don't, for that matter.., want any extreme left-wingers. I want
people who come from the middle."'2 0 The Judicial Advisory Committee
created to review candidates for federal district court judgeships in California
will face the same issue. Senator Feinstein explained that the committee is
designed to "provide a bipartisan balance" on the federal bunch, a result that
can be achieved by naming judges of many different philosophies so long as
the requisite balance is maintained.' Senator Boxer, however, sees the role of
the committee as identifying "moderate judicial candidates," which
significantly narrows the pool of individuals who will be eligible to serve as
federal judges.'22 The distinction between Senator Feinstein's view and
Senator Boxer's view asks whether we are best served by naming the best
moderate, the best conservative, and the best liberal to the Court, or rather
whether we should appoint the first, second, and third best moderates. The
best judges of all philosophies can serve on the federal district courts and
Cass Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 2001, at A18.
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courts of appeals if the President and the Senate are willing to work together.
A search restricted to "moderates" is unlikely to yield any different results in
the future than it has to date.
The premise of this collaborative approach-that multiple vacancies
provide an opportunity to appoint different kinds of judges-makes it unlikely
to solve the debate surrounding the selection of Supreme Court Justices. The
primacy of judicial philosophy reaches its apex when the composition of the
Court is at issue. Each Court nomination, therefore, can expect to provoke a
public relations battle commensurate with the competing parties' view of the
importance of the questions at hand. The rising perception of the stakes of
each Court appointment make it increasingly likely that any nominee will have
to receive the consent of sixty senators, rather than fifty, in order to defeat a
filibuster by the discontented minority. Any President who confronts that
scenario must decide which interested parties he or she is willing to offend.
Such an unenviable task may lead politicians take the same escapist route that
shifts many contested questions to be decided through direct democracyleave the decision to the People themselves, in this instance via judicial
elections. That may be the only way to accurately gauge the People's view of
the appropriate judicial philosophy, but the well-documented concerns about
judicial elections suggest caution before choosing judges by election even in
those circumstances.123
Judicial elections and judicial appointments thus face many of the same
challenges. Which method is best has occupied Americans at least since
Alexander Hamilton defended judicial appointments in Federalist No. 78,",
and it is unlikely that either method will displace the other any time soon.
What is new is the stakes of judicial selections, as demonstrated most
dramatically by the role of state and federal judges in adjudicating the disputes
arising out of the 2000 presidential election. Those events should remind us
that the most important question is not how judges are selected, but why.
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